Iraq Cabinet Approves U.S. Security Pact

A Crucial Seal of Approval

After nearly a year of tough negotiations and fiery debate, Iraq's Shi'a and Kurdish-dominated government finally approved the highly controversial Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States—setting a final deadline for the full withdrawal of U.S. troops in Iraq and granting Iraq a great deal of juridical control over military operations in the country. The 37-member cabinet met as expected yesterday after a week of mulling over a U.S. response to proposed Iraqi amendments of a draft version of the deal which was submitted to the United States for review last month (see Iraq – United States: 22 October 2008: U.S. Warns of Dramatic Consequences as Iraq Demands Changes to Security Deal). Twenty-seven of the 28 cabinet-members that were present approved the deal, nine members were absent, and the only present member that voted against the deal was a Sunni Muslim. The SOFA, if passed by parliament next week and then approved by the three-member Presidential Council, will regulate the legal status of U.S. troops in Iraq after the end in December this year of the United Nations mandate which is currently regulating the operations of all foreign troops in Iraq.

The agreement was expected to be signed 31 July and come into force 1 January 2009. However, the deal has been held up over contentious issues, perceived by Iraqi politicians as posing a potential threat to the country's sovereignty. Iraq has consistently demanded that a strict timeframe be set for U.S. troop withdrawals, that U.S. soldiers not be immune from Iraqi law; and that Iraqi security forces gain more control over U.S. security operations in the country. Under the approved deal it appears that most Iraqi demands have been satisfied. It is stipulated that U.S. troops will be withdrawn from towns and cities by summer 2009 and from the country by 2011; that the legal proceedings for 16,400 Iraqi detainees will be handed over to Iraqi courts and, crucially, that U.S. troops will not be immune from Iraqi law for actions taken outside their bases or when they are off-duty.

The 'Withdrawal Agreement' – Pushing for Concessions

Although the exact details of the deal have not been disclosed, one of the most significant revolves around setting a final troop-withdrawal date. Initially, President George W. Bush’s administration was strongly against a time-frame for withdrawal, advocating instead performance-based criteria. The United States has been guided by the success of a troop surge in 2007 which has greatly contributed to the improved security situation across Iraq and it fears that an untimely withdrawal would jeopardise the crucial security gains.

The Iraqi government under Shi'a prime minister Nuri al-Maliki and particularly the two main Shi'a parties (the Islamic Dawa and Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council (ISIC)) are likely to attempt to sell the deal to more fiercely nationalist forces as an agreement which secures a U.S. troop withdrawal, not as a deal to endorse their continued presence. Although it is a question of semantics, the revamping of SOFA to a "Withdrawal Agreement" illustrates the degree to which Nuri al-Maliki's government has been able to effectively secure the ownership not only of negotiations—as the government has proved above and beyond the expectations of many the ability to engage with the world's greatest power in intense negotiations—and effectively win the necessary concessions to make the deal an Iraqi victory. The United States is likely to remain generous with that interpretation as a sigh of relief will be drawn right about now in Washington, particularly as following the October submittal of proposed amendments by the Iraqi cabinet, the view looked grim from the U.S. side.

The Bush administration had effectively pushed concessions to the Iraqis as far as appeared realistic in attempting to retain sufficient legal protection for U.S. soldiers, as well as a time-frame which would provide the military command to help stabilise Iraq for the long-term, balanced against Iraq's demands for protection of sovereignty. Among the greatest sceptics’ fears were that the United States would have to seek an extension to the current United Nations mandate to authorise its troop presence, or in the worst case (albeit extremely unlikely) scenario, withdraw troops by the end of the year. Repeated statements from the U.S. military over the severe security deterioration which would result from a failure to finalise the agreement plus political warnings that it would not engage in renewed negotiations over substantive changes to the draft agreement were aimed at pressuring Iraq to approve the deal under tenure of the current U.S. administration; there were fears that Iraq was delaying a decision, hoping that a U.S. government under Barack Obama would allow greater concessions.

Outlook and Implications

Although the deal is considered to be a victory for Nuri al-Maliki's bid to become Iraq's first post-war unifying prime minister ahead of provincial and legislative elections next year, opinion is still fiercely split over the virtues of a security deal with the United States. Some have viewed U.S. troops as crucial not only to guaranteeing basic security but also as a middle-party presence to mediate between Sunni-Shi'a-Kurdish divisions which are increasingly affecting the security forces. The potential danger points are multiple; not only are the security forces (which total some 560,000 members according to the Brookings Institution's Iraq Index), hardly ready to secure the country domestically or against foreign aggression, theyare also poorly trained and lack sufficient equipment despite plans to purchase modern supplies. Furthermore, the situation is exacerbated by the looming clash between Iraqi security forces and Kurdish forces (peshmerga) in the ethnic fault-line areas along the border of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), particularly in Mosul in Ninewah Province. Question marks remain over the future of the Sunni-dominated Awakening Council fighters that have helped transform the security environment by fighting al-Qaida operatives. Such concerns appear to cross the ethnic and sectarian divides, with sections of the Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish groups supporting a deadline-based deal.