Pakistan Takes New Approach in Fight Against Extremism

The Pakistani military has significantly stepped up its efforts to counter the threat posed by Islamic militants. These developments come after Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari, and Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai have pledged their support for the U.S.-proposed "Af-Pak" strategy. Namely, there were three key developments last weekend that have been unprecedented in scale and could be an indication of a major shift in policy and co-ordination among Pakistan's top military and government leaders:

• Zardari has officially ordered the military to "wipe out" militants in restive Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-West Frontier Provinces (NWFP) areas, and some reports claim that up to 700 militants have already been killed. Currently, there are reportedly 15,000 troops in Swat valley, fighting about 5,000 militants in what Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani this weekend officially termed a "guerrilla war".
• Even more troops have been ordered to these areas from the Indian border as Zardari for the first time officially acknowledged that Islamic militants, not India, were Pakistan's prime enemy.
• Zardari ordered madrassas (religious schools) to be taken over by the government, to prevent students from coming under the influence of Islamic militants.

A New Consensus?

The fact that Zardari officially ordered the military to wipe out terrorism indicates a major shift in policy and co-operation between the military, the government and opposition and perhaps even the intelligence agencies in the country. Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, Pakistan's Prime Minister, who is considered to have played a significant behind-the-scenes role in resolving the recent stand-off between Zardari and former PM and opposition leader Nawaz Sharif, backed Zardari's order saying that there was "no other option". He also said that other key stakeholders, such as parliamentarians from the area, support the move. Even Nawaz Sharif, who never tires of criticising the ruling government and its leader, supported the military action against militants. One interesting question to ask at this point is to what extent this apparent consensus really is due to the realisation that the militants pose a lethal threat to the existence of Pakistan, or whether there are other factors involved. Looking at the political history of Pakistan, fraught with political strife and major divisions between political parties, consensus is indeed rare. It may have been helped by the massive stimulus package offered by the United States since it announced its new Af-Pak strategy, and assurances to Zardari that the United States would not drop its allies in times of difficulties as has been done in the past. Knowing what is at stake, Pakistan is aware that the United States has to deliver. Thus being "united" against extremism, and wavering criticism that Pakistani institutions are corrupt and "largely dysfunctional" is the ticket to the aid package. That Pakistan is in a strong negotiating position on this point is further indicated by remarks Zardari made yesterday, that in addition to the aid already promised, there would need to be more help, adding that "altogether this aid package is not even one-tenth of what you give AIG".

Redefining the Threat

One of Washington's key demands on Pakistan this year was getting it to acknowledge that Islamic militants, not India, pose the main threat to the country's integrity. While for Washington this mainly means the availability of more troops to be sent to the FATA and NWFP areas, such a statement is a huge psychological step for Pakistan's leadership. The India threat scenario essentially provided political parties with the ability to mobilise voters, as resentment against India sits deep among large parts of the Pakistani population and provides a profound delineation of nationalist identity. However, militancy does not enjoy outright support among most of the populace either; a recent poll suggested that it is the economy, not militancy or even India, that was a key concern for Pakistanis. If the war against militants becomes a prolonged one, and with heavy civilian casualties (as can be expected), public resentments against the government may well serve to break up the unity, laying the groundwork for both social and political unrest. Indeed, the fear of socio-economic tensions is another factor forging consensus between political parties in return for international aid. Furthermore, while India may welcome such statements, it remains to be seen to what extent the military will be able to defeat militants, and not just disperse them. Should the latter happen, it is highly likely that the Taliban will increasingly resort to asymmetric tactics internally and in sensitive areas, including India and Kashmir. Further orchestrated attacks on India such as the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, would escalate tensions between India and Pakistan, inhibiting the government's capacity to redistribute forces.

Controlling Madrassas

Zardari also vowed to bring all madrassas in the country under the control of the government, in an apparent bid to prevent students from being converted into extremists. While not unprecedented (there have previously been such attempts for Pakistan's approximately 20,000 madrassas in 2001 and 2002, but these were highly unpopular and moderately successful at best, barring mainly foreigners from attending), the significance in that lies more in the fact that in doing so, the Pakistani government is essentially again reacting to criticism mounted by Washington and the United Kingdom government. Interestingly, Zardari remained extremely vague with regard to the terms and modalities with which such a move would be carried out, and it should be noted that these vows have been made in direct connection with Zardari asking for more aid. Even if Pakistan is to clamp down harder against extremism in madrassas, it remains to be seen how the government's activities will be received domestically, as it is these institutions that provide the poorest with education, shelter and food.

Outlook and Implications