Sri Lankan President Declares End to 26-Year Civil War

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse officially announced the total defeat of the conventional forces of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Parliament today. He said that Sri Lanka was now under the complete control of the authorities and that terrorism has been quelled completely. These announcements come a day after Sri Lankan Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka announced the LTTE's defeat, and claimed the death of leading LTTE figures, including Velupillai Prabhakaran, at the hand of the Sri Lankan military during their final assault. Also reportedly killed in the final assault were up to 300 LTTE fighters, including top LTTE strategists Colonel Soosai (leader of the LTTE's naval wing), Pottu Amman (intelligence chief), and Prabhakaran's son Charles Anthony (head of information technology wing). The Tamil side, however, vowed to continue their struggle for a Tamil homeland and denied the death of their leader. The LTTE's international relations chief Selvarasa Pathmanathan claimed that he is "safe", adding that "he will continue to lead the quest for dignity and freedom for the Tamil people". While the Sri Lankan forces showed a body to the media today, claiming it be Prabhakaran, the body's identity could not yet entirely be identified.

The conflict between Sri Lanka's minority Tamil and majority Sinhalese population, fought over a separate Tamil homeland in the north of the country, led to a 26-year-long civil war that has cost the lives of an estimated 70,000 people and caused hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The military victory over the LTTE, which once controlled almost one-third of the country and ran a de-facto state, was partly attributable to shrinking international support for the LTTE's cause, but also because of the ruthless conduct of war the Sri Lankan military has exercised. In line with the international clampdown against terrorism, the LTTE was branded a terrorist organisation by 32 states, including the United States, European Union states, Australia and India, due to the organisation's heavy reliance on guerrilla warfare tactics. In the final assault on remaining LTTE strongholds rights groups have reported severe shelling of areas populated by civilians, including hospitals and IDP camps. With the announcement of the end of the war, all eyes are now on post-conflict reconstruction and a political solution to the root causes of conflict.

Root Causes of Conflict Remain Unaddressed

The ruthless conduct of war on both sides, but especially the final assault on the part of the Sri Lankan government are unlikely to be spurred by any intention to recognise the demands as set forth by Tamil separatist leaders, despite pressure from the international community led by the United States and neighbouring India. The roots of the conflict lie in the increasing political, social and economic sidelining of the Tamil population at the hands of the Sinhalese majority after Sri Lanka's independence, embedded into the constitution of the country. The Tamil population originally emigrated under British rule from India to staff the colonial bureaucracy, attaining a privileged status in society. However, post-independence, the Tamils were effectively sidelined in almost all aspects of society, starting from the barring from government jobs, to increasingly small quotas for attending university, and severe restrictions on employment opportunities. The final push towards militancy is said to have been spurred by constitutional changes in 1972, in which Sinhala became the national language and Buddhism the state religion. This also led to the renaming of the country from Ceylon to Sri Lanka. Federalism was explicitly prohibited, meaning that the Tamil minority concentrated in north and eastern areas of the country was effectively subjected to Sinhalese majority rule, and pockets of Tamil majorities inside the country were deliberately eroded by targeted settlement programmes of Sinhalese in Tamil areas. These developments have led to a number of militant Tamil outfits, of which the LTTE became the strongest. While an independent state for Tamils now is off limits, it is widely accepted that a political solution must opt for a federal state system with significant devolution of powers. It remains to be seen how committed the Sri Lankan government is to achieve this goal, especially considering Rajapakse's history of being hostile to the Tamil's political demands. Rajapakse said that he views the military victory as a victory of the entire Sri Lankan nation, including Tamils, but it is highly unlikely that constitutional changes will be made at such magnitude that Tamils feel politically and socially integrated into the Sri Lankan state.

There is also a need for both Tamils and Sinhalese to come to terms with the past. Both sides have been accused by human rights groups of having committed serious human rights abuses, especially during the final assault in recent weeks. The European Union has already demanded an independent inquiry into these.

Civilian Plight and Reconstruction Efforts

While addressing the root causes of the conflict is an absolute necessity to prevent further violence in the future, it is also imperative to address the issues of socio-economic hardship that those affected by the war are still suffering. More than 280,000 IDPs (internally displaced persons) were created by fighting in recent weeks alone, and most of them are now housed in camps run by the government. A lack of basic amenities such as food and clean water, shelter, and lack of basic healthcare and education, all rampant in IDP camps and areas affected by fighting in Sri Lanka, can lead to social unrest and can in itself be a source of unrest and rising crime rates. Furthermore, psychological wounds inflicted by war crimes and conventional conduct of war may support a sentiment of hatred among Tamil civilians and former fighters against the Sinhalese majority. Dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder and related psychological issues could therefore be a contributing factor to preventing or reducing further inter-ethnic escalation of conflict. However, the Sri Lankan government has so far denied most humanitarian organisations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), access to the former war zones, at times when the suffering of civilians is greatest and no aid has reached them for over a week. Only few UN agencies were granted restricted access to camps, with them complaining about the camps being heavily militarised.

A further, related, issue is that of reconstruction of war-torn areas. Large swathes of Sri Lanka's infrastructure are now devastated. To ensure social and economic wellbeing, huge amounts of reconstruction aid need to be spent. With the Sri Lankan economy encumbered with a huge fiscal deficit and acute balance-of-payments stress, the government will have to rely on international aid money to do this. While Rajapakse has said he would seek help, he also made clear today that it is only material help, not advice, the government is looking for. This reflects the country's strong insistence on its foreign policy principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, but also suggests that the government envisages targeted spending on its own purposes. It will be interesting to see to what extent Tamils can have a say in the way in which this aid is being spent.  

Outlook and Implications

While conventional warfare has officially ended, peace between Tamil and Sinhalese communities ultimately depends on the way in which the government now addresses the root causes of the Tamil insurgencies as well as the intense socio-economic hardship that people face in war-torn areas. So far, the Rajapakse administration has failed to come up with satisfactory solutions to the two main issues to be resolved, with its government of Tamil-dominated eastern states subdued last year widely criticised by independent international observers. Violent protests by Tamils around the world (not all of which have supported the violent strategies opted for by the LTTE), including in Washington, London and Geneva, indicate that many on the Tamil side are wary of the vague promises made by Rajapakse about finding a political solution to the conflict. The burning of Sri Lankan flags during some of the demonstrations does not bode well for Tamil willingness to be co-opted by the state. One problem surely lies with Rajapakse himself, who has in the past been known for his hard stance against integrating Tamils into national politics. His hardliner position is all the more significant as he is vested with immense political powers (he is both head of government and head of state). There is also much scepticism about what the real situation in formerly Tamil-held areas is, and this includes the status of Prabhakaran and the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe. With journalists having been deported in recent weeks, and a generally repressive environment preventing free reporting, chances are that tendencies against the government's political accommodation activities may not be sufficiently discussed. For now, while the LTTE leadership may be decimated, there remains the remote possibility of remaining cadres resorting to asymmetric war tactics, including suicide bombings throughout the country. It should also be noted that historically the Tamils were not a united force centred around the LTTE. Various splits occurred, for example in March 2004 V. Muralitharan (known as Karuna) led many to leave movement and to form a rival organisation, highlighting the capacity of the organisation to regenerate in new forms. With the Tamil community essentially divided, the possibilities are that only parts of them may be attracted into future political deals.