Election 2009: Crunch Time for Lebanese Factions in Final Run-Up to Historic Polls

The Lebanese people will head to the polls on Sunday (7 June) to vote in what has promised to be historic elections (see Lebanon: 21 May 2009: Traditional Themes Loom Large in Lebanon's Historic Elections). The legacy of the past four years since the last general elections in 2005 has been dominated by the assassination on 14 February 2005 of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Hariri’s assassination was the most significant systemic shock to have hit Lebanon since the end of the country’s devastating 15-year civil war (1975-1990). Since Hariri’s murder in 2005, Lebanon has faced two additional systemic shocks—Israel’s 34-day war with Hizbollah in summer 2006, and the May 2008 eruption of political violence between the two main political blocs, March 14 and March 8, in Beirut. After four years of perennial political upheaval the Lebanese will be putting the two major factions—the Western-backed bloc currently holding the parliamentary majority and the Syria and Iran supported Hizbollah-led opposition—to what amounts to an effective referendum.

Few pollsters have been so brave as to predict the outcome of Sunday’s polls but most agree that the call will be close. The stakes are extremely high as it is unclear at this point whether we will see another unity government following the creation in May last year of a government consisting of both camps. That agreement was only struck in the aftermath of deadly clashes between the two sides that same month and after a Qatari-mediated peace now known as the Doha agreement. Qatar secured the opposition—Hizbollah and its allies—one-third of the seats in Fuad Seniora’s cabinet, allowing March 8 to block government decisions. March 14 has now said it will not renew the deal struck at Doha after 7 June and will neither include Hizbollah in a unity government nor accept any similar invitation by Hizbollah.

March 14

The so-called March 14 parliamentary majority holders include the Sunni-dominated Future Movement led by Saad Hariri, the son and political heir of the slain ex-premier Rafiq Hariri. The bloc, dominated by Hariri’s Future Movement in alliance with Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces and Amine Gemayel’s Phalange (both Christian-dominated parties) and the Progressive Socialist Party led by Druze strongman Walit Jumblatt, took its name from the Cedar Revolution, a mass, popular show of force staged in Beirut in protest at Hariri’s murder. Since their 2005 electoral victory the Western-backed majority has attempted to steer the country into an era of "sovereignty". However, with a relatively dismal track-record to show for its four years in power, March 14’s majority position is not secure in the upcoming polls. At the core of the March 14 alliance lies a shared antipathy to Syrian domination and a categorical rejection of the Hizbollah movement’s arsenal. In addition, March 14 has a declared commitment to expanding the powers of the government and state and supports the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon which has been charged with probing the Hariri murder (see Lebanon: 30 April 2009: Hariri Tribunal Orders Release of Four Lebanese Suspects and Lebanon: 26 May 2009: Election 2009: Report Implicates Hizbollah in Hariri Murder, Heightens Tension Ahead of Lebanese Polls). 

March 8

On the opposite spectrum is the so-called March 8 alliance, spearheaded by the armed Hizbollah group and its fellow Shi’a party, Amal. It also includes an alliance with the Christian leader, General Michel Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement. Dubbed "the resistance" Hizbollah has been a key adversary of Israel, a strategic partner in Lebanon for both Syria and Iran, and a strong, popular movement to be reckoned with. Furthermore, its leader, the enigmatic Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, has gained much admiration across the Middle East region, even though the party’s state-within-a-state has been heavily criticised as the foremost destabilising element to Lebanon’s delicate political balance. Most notably, Hizbollah’s insistence on retaining its armed wing in resistance to Israel’s continued occupation of the Shebaa Farms in south Lebanon has been a significant blow to the credibility and legitimacy of the Lebanese Armed Forces and to the government of Prime Minister Fuad Seniora. Nevertheless, unwilling to revamp itself, Hizbollah has managed to straddle the barrier between being a political party proper and a sectarian militia, a relic from Lebanon’s bloody past. Only last month, the movement was blamed by the German magazine Der Spiegel for being behind the assassination of Rafiq Hariri.

What if Hizbollah Wins?

The question most observers are asking themselves right about now is—what if Hizbollah wins. What then? Will we see a return of Syrian dominance and the entry of Iranian influence into Lebanon? The answer is probably yes. Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, said rather ominously recently that if Hizbollah wins, a new front would open against the fight with Israel. There is little doubt that tensions would immediately begin to soar in the region if March 8 wins, and the possibility for future conflict with Israel would increase. Some of Hizbollah’s main critics have said that Lebanon would effectively be turned into another Gaza, a reference to the embattled Gaza Strip governed by the estranged Palestinian Hamas party which has been labelled a terrorist organisation by Western governments. Certainly, the question of Hizbollah’s arsenal, or rather of Hizbollah’s dismantling of its arsenal will be out of the question, as it arguably already is, if March 8 wins. Furthermore, by implication the Hizbollah-led government will pose a significant challenge to external powerbrokers the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and other moderate Arab states. Furthermore, it will call into question whether the significant economic and military aid provided by these states will continue to flow as there is little doubt that a Hizbollah victory would entail a more open door both to Syria and Iran. The U.S. government has already signalled its hesitance to deal with a government led by an movement it has designated as terrorist—military aid would most definitely be off the table in a non-unity government and economic aid would be seriously reconsidered. Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) has remained non-committal as to how it would deal with Lebanon going forward if March 8 wins. The EU alone has provided the embattled country with some US$84 million per year following the 2007 Paris III donor conference which saw international donors pledge a total of US$7.6 billion in aid. The real possibility of a March 8 victory has already seen Hizbollah in talks with the IMF, in the hope of securing the pledged funds (see Lebanon: 27 May 2009: Election 2009: Hizbollah in Talks with IMF Ahead of Lebanese Polls—Report). 

Outlook and Implications

Over the past four years Lebanon has been in a state of functional dysfunction, a stable limbo waiting to be resolved by the ballot box after years of mounting tension between the two camps. Although Lebanon’s confessional system—which has seen the two sides rely heavily on expedient alliances—will prevent a political breakdown, there is significant scope for unpredictable results; the eruption of political violence, as ever in Lebanon, is never far away.