Major Offensive Against Taliban an Important Test for New Afghanistan Strategy

About 4,000 U.S. marines and 650 Afghan security forces have moved into Afghanistan's restive Helmand Province in the south of the country in a major effort to reduce the control of the Taliban there. The operation called Khanjar (Pashtu for dagger) is being carried out both by air and ground forces and is expected to last for about 36 hours. About 10 hours into the operation the military said that troops encountered little resistance, but it was announced yesterday that the U.S. suffered one casualty, and the commander of the operation, Brigadier General Larry Nicholson said that forces were in a "hell of a fight". The Taliban have dismissed the new offensive, saying that previous such operations have failed to reach their objectives. Yesterday, the Afghan military leadership announced that the joint operation met its first success by capturing Khanishin district in a remote region in southern Helmand province.

The offensive is the first major operation of the U.S. military in Afghanistan since Barack Obama unveiled his new and ambitious war plan for the country in late March this year, and comes after the new U.S. commander for Afghanistan, General Stanley McCrystal, announced that he would make significant adjustments to U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan. The offensive comes ahead of the country's second-ever presidential election, to be held on 20 August, and Nicholson has voiced hopes that "our actions will allow voter registration in areas where there has been none". The Taliban ruled the country from 1996 to 2001, but were ousted from power in 2001 when U.S.-led NATO forces invaded the country.

Important Changes in Military Strategy

This is the biggest battle that U.S. marines have engaged in since the battle of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004, and this confirms that priorities in the U.S. approach to Afghanistan have undergone a significant change. In Afghanistan, this is also the first major battle since U.S. president Barack Obama announced his new Afghanistan strategy that aims at turning the tide with regard to the increasingly successful Taliban insurgency. The last major battle against the Taliban in Afghanistan was led by the British, who carried out an offensive using about 5,500 troops in Helmand, but failed to push back the Taliban there. Considering the lack of major military activities against the Taliban, and their resurging strength over the past two years, this offensive marks an important test for the viability of the new strategy. While the real effects of it may only become visible over the course of the coming months, it is worth reflecting on the changes that are visible with regard to strategic moves as well as the general conduct of the operation.

First, the size of the operation signifies that Afghanistan enjoys top priority status on the foreign policy agenda of the United States. Ahead of the offensive, the United States has deployed an additional 21,000 troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total number of U.S. troops there to 68,000 by the end of the year, with 57,000 already on the ground. These are in addition to around 33,000 troops from coalition partners hailing from more than 40 countries.

Second, Operation Khanjar indicates that these troops will increasingly move out of large base camps and into smaller "forward operating bases" (FOBs). This indicates an emulation of tactics used to turn the tide in Iraq in early 2007. Tellingly, areas are being attacked that have never been entirely under control of coalition forces. Key targets are the often inaccessible areas in Helmand province, including the districts of Nawa and Garmsir, and these areas are known to harbour insurgents, and much of the opium that is thought to fund the insurgent's activities is believed to be produced there.

Third, there appears to be a major shift away from solely targeting the Taliban towards winning the "hearts and minds" of people, in what can be seen as a major shift away from conventional war tactics towards anti-insurgency operations. Following a statement of McCrystal that "you don’t really need to chase and kill the Taliban. What you need to do is take away the one thing they absolutely have to have and that's access and support of the people", it is striking that Nicholson in Operation Khanjar has placed much emphasis on "making contact" with local people. He remained worryingly vague on this, but he did indicate that one of the main differences with other offensives was that "we're going down there, and we're going to stay". Judging from the military's intention to meet with locals, it appears that part of the new plan is to cut off the Taliban from local support, a move that is widely seen as vital to push back the Taliban, but also one that depends greatly on the military's ability to limit civilian casualties.

Outlook and Implications

The counter-insurgency measures that aim to separate the population from the Taliban are an important and broadly positive shift, but there are reasons to doubt a quick and decisive win against the Taliban. On the one hand, it is clear that the Taliban stand no chance against the coalition forces on the battlefield, forcing them to retreat to the hills, but the fact that the United States has claimed to have met "little resistance" also indicates that the Taliban will resort to those tactics that have earned them most dividends in the past, namely ambushes, suicide attacks and roadside bombings. And while centring their efforts in the South, Washington risks losing the North and Kabul, raising the risk of a fully fledged national insurgency. The Taliban also continue to enjoy large swathes of territory of "safe havens" in Pakistan. Although the Pakistani military has launched major attacks against these since early May 2009, it ruled out last week taking on important factions of the Taliban, including in crucial North Waziristan. It also remains to be seen to what extent the United States will be able to persuade locals to stop their support for the Taliban, as their reasons for doing so are extremely diverse, ranging from socio-economic reasons to anger over killed family members through one of the coalition forces' many air strikes in the region since 2006. The objective of winning the "hearts and minds" of people may further be complicated by tough fighting that is likely to ensue at various locations in Kandahar and Helmand province, as the Taliban have frequently hidden among civilians in the past. Any civilian casualties resulting from these fights are likely to further increase resentment against coalition forces.