Election 2010: Landmark Polls to Test Iraq's Democracy and Stability

On Sunday (7 March) 10,000 polling stations will open across Iraq’s 18 provinces to elect the country’s second permanent leadership since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Close to 19 million Iraqis are eligible to vote at home; another 1.4 million expatriates are also registered. Some 6,200 candidates are competing for parliament’s 325 seats. The elections represent Iraq’s fifth nationwide elections since 2003, and the beginning perhaps of a political culture—however flawed—which takes its legitimacy from the ballot box rather than force as throughout much of the country’s history.

Risks

As ever with Iraq, dangers loom large. As anticipation rises ahead of the polls, so do concerns surrounding violent attacks with the enduring but beleaguered insurgency struggling to regain political leverage in the country. Yesterday as early voting was underway for members of the security forces, prisoners and the sick, two polling stations were bombed in the capital, Baghdad, killing 14 people. Sporadic attacks have been on the rise leading up to the elections, stirring fears that Sunday will turn bloody despite ramped up security measures. Earlier this week 33 people were killed in triple bombings in the capital of Diyala province, Baquba. To be sure, the insurgency is expected to make concerted efforts to derail the polls. Last month, the head of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi warned that the militant group would attempt to ''prevent the elections by all legitimate means possible, primarily by military means". However, barring a major Sunni boycott of the vote—something which would provide the faltering insurgency with much-needed moral and political capital—these efforts will likely have limited effect.

The risks are manifold and the legitimacy of the polls and the incoming government could be hurt by a number of factors:

• Boycott: A widespread boycott by any one group would be one of the most significant blows to the legitimacy of the polls and the eventual government.
• Irregularities: To some degree irregularities are expected to occur. However, these would only constitute a major risk to legitimacy if they happen on a large scale and cause one or several groups to renounce the results.
• Foreign interference: A perception that the elections have been severely influenced by foreign forces—by Iran, Gulf Arab states, and the United States—could damage the legitimacy of the polls.
• Government-formation delays: A prolonged delay would damage the legitimacy of the incoming administration and governing bloc as well as possibly complicating the withdrawal of all U.S. combat troops by the end of August 2010.

Key Political Lists

For a full analysis of the elections see IHS Global Insight’s recent special report on Iraq (see Iraq: 1 March 2010: The Scramble for Iraq: Elections and Scenarios).

A fortuitous leader, Maliki was largely elected in May 2006 on his credentials as a weak figure susceptible to manipulation after the initial pick for the prime ministerial post, Ibrahim Jafaari, was ousted. Since then, he has emerged as an unexpectedly strong politician. In many ways, Maliki effectively launched his re-election in the lead-up to the January 2009 provincial elections. The results showed that his methods had gained him significant support (see Iraq: 6 February 2009: Preliminary Results of Provincial Elections Show Major Wins for Iraq's Premier). However, seen by many as a power-grabbing and centralising leader, he has also stirred fears. Although Maliki’s State of Law coalition has set the trend for the creation of other similarly secular, cross-factional lists, his sometimes questionable tactics and support for a ban of some 500 election candidates for their alleged connection to the outlawed Ba’ath party has damaged his self-styled secular and non-sectarian agenda. Thus, Maliki’s re-election is by no means guaranteed. On Sunday he competes against the Iraqqiya list and the United Iraqi Alliance that are running on a largely similar platform. State of Law will find it difficult to gain wide support from the core Sunni constituency which is expected to participate with greater force, a reversal of their boycott of the 2005 polls. Maliki’s failed attempts to court the Sunni National Dialogue Front’s Saleh al-Mutlaq and Anbar tribal leader Ahmad Abu Risha dealt a blow to his chances on that front. Meanwhile, Iraqqiya may have gained significant moral support after the candidates ban debacle which saw Mutlaq—a key figure on the list—excluded from the polls. Iraqqiya is headed by former interim prime minister Iyad Allawi, whose hopes for the premiership are certainly high.

The main Shi’a parties, excluding Maliki’s Islamic Dawa, have regrouped to form the National Iraqi Alliance (NIA) (see Iraq: 25 August 2009: Iraqi Premier Excluded from Revived Shi'a Alliance). The alliance will have much to prove on Sunday having suffered in the provincial elections. Although NIA will benefit from its nominal unity in the polls, it will struggle to remain intact in the face of deep internal divisions among the constituent parties as well as the weakness of their leaderships. Meanwhile, the main Sunni list, the Iraqi Accord, once again dominated by the Iraqi Islamic Party, is expected to lose seats amid the wider participation of Sunni groups in comparison to 2005. The main Kurdish parties will run on separate lists with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) on the Kurdistani List and opposition movement Gorran (Change) on a separate list. The Kurdish divisions will likely see the dominating KDP-PUK alliance weakened in Baghdad, however, the factions are expected to stay close together when it comes to issues concerning retaining the Kurdistan Region’s autonomy (see Iraq: 29 July 2009: Election 2009: Mixed Fortunes for Ruling Coalition in Iraqi Kurdistan Polls).

Outlook and Implications

The stakes are undoubtedly high as political forces compete for political control of the country. Among the factions competing in the polls there is an acute sense that political gains must be maximised while the system remains to some degree in a state of flux and open to influence. Factions are fighting tooth-and-nail in what can best be described as a "scramble" for power, resources, and political guarantees. Certainly, the coming five years will be critical in determining Iraq’s path and the character of the fledging political system. Critical issues regarding power and resource sharing, the extent and nature of the federal system, and the ever-elusive hopes for "national reconciliation" will have to be addressed by the new leadership. Furthermore, if all goes to plan, the new government will oversee the full withdrawal of U.S. troops by the end of 2011. So far the trend suggests that the road ahead may ultimately continue towards stability, even if mired with difficulties. Over the past five years, Iraqi factions have proven their commitment to creating a functional political system. With the cost of a political breakdown too high, they have preferred to resolve disputes by hammering out agreements that meet their minimum requirements through peaceful means.