Same-Day Analysis
Election 2010: Preliminary Poll Results Show Iraqi Premier in Narrow Lead
Published: 3/15/2010
IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition continued its electoral gains with victories in Baghdad and Basra. The premier's list is ahead in seven out of 18 provinces, tightly followed by the Iraqqiya list, the Kurdistan Alliance, and the National Iraqi Alliance (NIA). |
Implications | Although Maliki's success is undeniable, it is unclear with what margins he has won in each province, meaning that his victory is likely a narrow one that will complicate the formation of a new government. |
Outlook | Although few of the prominent political lists want to see him back in power, Maliki's government formation efforts may benefit from the fact that Iraq's political factions are opportunistic and will likely prefer a chance to be close to the centre of power and have a say in decision-making in the crucial four years ahead—rather than remain on its outskirts. |
State of Law’s Stride to Victory?
After a much criticised, preliminary results for all 18 provinces came in yesterday, a week after the country’s landmark elections. Largely confirming earlier predictions and estimates, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition has fared well in seven provinces south of the capital, while the Iraqqiya list led by former interim premier Iyad Allawi is ahead north of Baghdad and south of the Kurdistan Region. Elsewhere, the Iraqi National Alliance does not appear to have lost too much ground since the January 2009 provincial elections—a victory of sorts for the grand Shi’a alliance which had feared more losses to Maliki’s list. In the Kurdistan Region, the Kurdistan Alliance—comprised of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—was in the lead, challenged by opposition list, Gorran (Change).
With the much-anticipated results from Baghdad, which has 70 seats designated in the 325-seat parliament, showing Maliki’s State of Law ahead, the premier’s lead appears relatively secured. State of Law has thus added Baghdad to the list of six other provinces: oil-rich Basra, Babil, Muthanna, and Wasit as well as the Shi’a religious capitals Najaf, Karbala. Cementing the gains made during the 2009 provincial elections, State of Law has built on its Shi’a dominated and southern constituency. This is despite Maliki’s best efforts to strengthen State of Law’s appeal to Sunnis as a cross-sectarian nationalist coalition, as the lists popularity in north of Baghdad, south of Kurdistan is extremely weak.
Iyad Allawi’s Iraqqiya list on the other hand has secured a clearly Sunni constituency, while also making possibly significant inroads in the south as well as in the capital. The list is in the lead in several restive provinces: Ninewa, Salahaddin, Diyala, Anbar, and surprisingly in the oil-rich disputed province of Kirkuk where yesterday it was said hold a slim lead over the Kurdistan Alliance with over 60% of the votes tallied. For the Kurdistan Alliance an Iraqqiya win in Kirkuk will certainly be viewed with apprehension and suspicion. The Kurds had largely expected to take Kirkuk—a much-needed victory for successfully negotiating the incorporation of parts of the province into the Kurdistan Region. Meanwhile, the grand Shi’a alliance, National Iraqi Alliance was ahead in Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Qadissiya.
Outlook and Implications
Not so Fast…
Conclusive analysis at this point would be premature. However, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn and the results are significantly more fragmented than they appear at first glance. To begin with, State of Law does not appear to be winning with wide margins in each of the provinces where the list is in the lead. For example, in Baghdad, it appears to be ahead with less than 40% of the vote, followed by narrow margins by NIA and Iraqqiya. Similarly, in Babel, State of Law’s victory is closely followed by NIA. It also appears that it probably has not secured more than 50% of the vote in any single province aside from Basra. Furthermore, the list has fared badly in central and northern provinces where it is not in the lead, apparently with less than 10% in Ninewa, Salahaddin, and critically in Anbar—the province which has become the symbol of the Sunni street. Iraqqiya’s sweep of Diyala and Anbar and apparent lead in Kirkuk are significant for the coalition which at the onset appeared a divided challenger to State of Law. The premier’s list has thus failed significantly in increasing its popularity with the Sunni constituency, raising the risk of the list being viewed in the future as a Shi’a list even though Maliki pulled out his Islamic Dawa from the former Shi’a bloc the United Iraqi Alliance, with the purpose of creating a cross-sectarian and secular agenda.
Final results are expected later this week, but given the delays that have already hit the ballot count, the announcement could be pushed back further. The uncertainty has caused some anxiety and frustration as well as criticism against Iraq’s electoral institutions. However, the uncertainty has not prevented intense post-election manoeuvrings from being launched. In the coming days and weeks factions can be expected to intensify bargaining and political horse trading. Without more than 162 seats in parliament Maliki will find it difficult to form a government and will necessarily have to reach out to one or more of the major lists, or many smaller factions. As IHS Global Insight has previously maintained, Maliki’s return to the government helm is not favoured by any of the major lists (see Iraq: 12 March 2010: Election 2010: Struggle Lies Ahead for Iraqi Premier as Results Trickle In). Maliki’s relations with the Kurds have been fraught with difficulty, at times reaching explosive levels over issues such as disputed territories and oil policy. Meanwhile, the NIA’s Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Sadrist Trend in particular, would be reluctant to see Maliki back in power, not to mention Iyad Allawi’s obvious reluctance to see his main challenger as premier again. However, alliances are not set in stone and Maliki may benefit from the fact that most factions are opportunistic and likely willing to shift their apparently solid principles to maximise power. Maliki and Allawi can both be expected to ramp up their efforts to get the Kurds and the NIA on their sides in coming days. Having competed on a relatively similar—secular, nationalist, centralizing—platform, to get the Kurds or Shia’s on their side, significant concessions would have to be made. This also means that any coalition formed will likely be weak and based on pragmatic alliances rather than a convergence of political principles.Most Viewed Articles
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