GAO: DNDO Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps, Vulnerabilities in Nuclear Detection

March 12, 2009 // Published as a news service by IHS

However, the DNDO is still in the early stages of program development and has not developed long-term plans, with costs and timeframes, for achieving its goal of closing these gaps by expanding radiological and nuclear detection capabilities, according to the report.

For example, the DNDO and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) were collaborating on radiological and nuclear detection options to better secure the land borders between ports of entry.

Experts said DNDO-sponsored field evaluations to test radiation detection equipment are still not complete and the DNDO and CBP may not have all radiation detection equipment in place until 2012, according to the report.

In addition, the DNDO is in the first year of a three-year maritime pilot program, working with the U.S. Coast Guard and local law enforcement agencies in Washington's Puget Sound area to field test equipment and to develop radiological and nuclear screening procedures.

Experts said the DNDO made little progress in developing criteria for assessing the success of the pilot to help determine whether it should be expanded to other locations and resolving some of the challenges it faces in the pilot program, such as technological limitations of the detection equipment and sustaining current detection efforts.

Although the DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies' programs to combat radiological and nuclear smuggling overseas, it worked with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Department of State to provide subject matter expertise and exchange lessons learned on radiological and nuclear detection.

Most of the DNDO's efforts are modest in scope, reflecting the fact that these agencies have well-established programs to combat nuclear smuggling.

For example, the DNDO worked with State's Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to develop model guidelines that other nations can use to establish their own nuclear detection programs.

According to the DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DoD, DOE and State in fiscal year 2007 for programs included in the global strategy for nuclear detection.

Of this amount, approximately $1.1 billion was budgeted for programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, $1.1 billion was budgeted for nuclear detection programs at the U.S. border and within the U.S. and approximately $577 million was budgeted to fund cross-cutting activities, such as providing technical support to users of the radiation detection equipment.

The DNDO collected budget data and published them in the Joint Annual Interagency Review, an annual report required by Congress.

DoD, DOE and State officials told the GAO that this information is used primarily as a status report of individual programs to combat nuclear smuggling. It is not used as a tool to help plan for or inform the future direction of the strategy or to help establish current or future priorities.

In April 2005, the DNDO was established within DHS to enhance and coordinate federal, state and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically and overseas.

The DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the DoD, DOE and State, a global strategy for nuclear detection - a system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities domestically and abroad.

The GAO was asked to examine the DNDO's progress in developing programs to address critical gaps in preventing nuclear smuggling domestically, the DNDO's role in supporting other agencies' efforts to combat nuclear smuggling overseas and the amount budgeted by DHS, DoD, DOE and State for programs that constitute the global nuclear detection strategy.

To do so, the GAO analyzed agency documents, visited select pilot program locations and interviewed agency, state and local officials.

The GAO recommended that DHS develop a plan for the domestic part of the global strategy and in coordination with the DoD, DOE and State, use the Joint Annual Interagency Review to guide future strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.

The GAO also has two recommendations related to maritime planning. DHS did not directly comment on the recommendations but said they aligned with the DNDO's efforts.

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).